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by Edward Cheng
W ith its wealth of electronic information, the Global Information Infrastructure (Gil) has the potential to improve services, create new markets and 
increase overall efficiency. Using the Gil, doctors can share 
opinions and information with medical professionals across the 
country, enhancing the care that they provide. Some 
government agencies now accept applications and contract bids 
in electronic form, reducing needless mountains of paperwork 
(as an example, the application for the US National Science 
Foundation scholarship is almost completely on-line). Industry 
even speculates about widespread electronic commerce in which 
the public will make transactional purchases on-line. However, 
all of these promising developments will require the electronic 
equivalent of a signature that performs two primary functions 
(in addition to confidentiality, requiring cryptographic 
solutions).
  Authenticating the identity of the message sender. Like conventional 
signatures, electronic ones must prove identity. For example, 
doctors in New York receiving advice from specialists in 
London need to verify that their colleagues (and not some 
hacker) sent the message.
  Ensuring the integrity of the message. Paper documents are 
somewhat difficult to alter because of their physical 
embodiment. In contrast, digital information can be changed 
without evidence of tampering, making integrity verification 
critical. For example, stockbrokers need to ensure that 
transaction orders are neither altered not damaged in transit,o 7
since $1,000 can easily become $10,000.
BACKGROUND READING
For background information on the operation of digital signatures, 
reader should consult the works of Daniel Greenwood, Wyrough, 
Bradford Biddle, A Michael Froomkin or any basic cryptography 
primer.
ESTABLISHING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Fortunately, digital signatures using public-key cryptography 
techniques can achieve the two requirements above. From a 
technical standpoint, digital signatures can prevent a person 
from falsely claiming that they never sent the message or that the 
message was altered, a quality called non-repudiation (Charles 
Merrill, 'An Attorney's Roadmap to the Digital Signature 
Guidelines' Electronic Banking and Law Report, September 1996, 
p. 13). However, technical non-repudiation does not 
automatically translate into legal non-repudiation. If a person 
uses a digital signature to sign an electronic agreement, it is not 
necessarily legally binding or enforceable. The law must first 
recognise the validity of digital signatures, and then it must 
provide a framework defining the relationships among the 
various parties (signer, recipient, third parties, etc.). A legal 
framework will allow judicial systems to uniformly and 
appropriately attribute liability and accountability.
LEGISLATE EXPEDIENTLY BUT 
CAUTIOUSLY
Industry and the public will be reluctant to develop electronic 
commerce under a cloud of legal certainty. Without a proper 
legal framework, parties will be exposed to unknown and 
potentially undesirable risks, discouraging their participation. 
For example, if a hacker forges a person's digital signature, to 
that extent they are liable (A Michael Froomkin, 'The Essential 
Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce', Oregon 
Law Review 49, 1996). Governments should act swiftly to create 
the policies and laws required by digital signatures. Case law 
should play a role, but its development is typically inconsistent, 
expensive and slow, providing little solace to parties wishing to 
assess their risk and liability. As a minimum, legislators should 
develop basic principles to direct and channel the judiciary, who 
will then flesh out the specifics.
However, as expressed by the UK's Department of Trade and 
Industry:
'These are complex issues and cannot be rushed. Such changes [in 
law] will help to underpin secure electronic commerce Jor a long time to 
come. We cannot afford to get it wrong.' flan Taylor, Licensing of 
Trusted Third Parties Jor the Provision of Encryption Services, 
http://www.steptoe.com/ukpub.htm).
Digital signatures are still an emerging technology and have 
not yet found widespread use. Thus, governments still have time 
to form task forces, issue draft legislation, hear testimony and 
carefully deliberate policy. However, ultimately, they should 
solidify the digital signature law through legislation, reassuring 
industry and promoting electronic commerce.
RECENT INITIATIVES
A number of US states, including Utah, California, Florida,
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Georgia and Massachusetts, have passed or are currently 
considering digital signature legislation 'to facilitate commerce 
by means of reliable electronic messages' (The Utah Digital 
Signature Act, cited by C Bradford Biddle, 'Misplaced Priorities: 
The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a 
Public Key infrastructure', San Diego Law Review 33, November 
1966). However in cyberspace these nuances are unacceptable. 
Policymakers cannot reasonably expect consumers to track their 
relevant jurisdiction on the Web and then determine the 
applicable laws. Even if Gil users tried jurisdiction in cyberspace 
is often ambiguous and undefined. Consequently, businesses and 
their customers will grow frustrated worrying about potential 
but unknown laws, obligations and liabilities.
CO-ORDINATED EFFORTS
Whether through the UN, World Trade Organization (WTO) 
or some other international body, governments should attempt 
to adopt uniform digital signature laws uniformly, as required by 
electronic commerce. This organization should review two 
avenues for co-ordinating digital signature legislation:
(i) endorsing an existing national, US state or model law and
promoting its enactment throughout the world.
(ii) write a new model law through compromise and 
negotiations. This new law should be acceptable to and 
enacted by most, if not all, nations.
TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL v TECHNOLOGY 
SPECIFIC
A substantive question for any new law is its breadth. Broad 
laws tend to be vague, lacking emphasis and impact. Specific 
laws, particularly regarding technology, can quickly become 
obsolete, thereby hindering innovation, rather than promoting 
it. Accordingly, recent initiatives on digital signatures fall into 
two schools of thought: technology neutral and technology 
specific. Technology neutral legislation is broader and does not 
specify any particular method, technology, or level of security. It 
focuses on legally recognizing a broad class of 'electronic 
signatures', which encompass:
'... any symbol or method executed or adopted by a party with 
present intention to be bound by or to authenticate record, 
accomplished by electronic means.' ('Daniel Greenwood, Electronic 
Signatures and Records: Legal, Policy and Technical Considerations, 9 
January 1997, http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/ltd/legal/e- 
sig.htm).
Under this definition, even a name typed at the end of an e- 
mail qualifies as an electronic signature; only the intent of 
authentication is important. For example, the California law 
references:
'... an electronic identifier, created by computer, intended by the 
party using it to have the samejorce and effect as the use of a manual 
signature. This definition does not include encryption.' (William E 
Wyrough Jr and Ron Klein, 'The Electronic Signature Act of 
1996: Breaking Down Barriers to Widespread Electronic 
Commerce in Florida, Florida State University Law Review, 1977, 
s. IVDSb)
Unfortunately, while broad 'electronic signature' legislation 
leaves flexibility for future innovation, it typically lacks any 
meaningful depth. Without a specific technology to reference, 
legislators experience great difficulty attributing any significant 
legal properties beyond simple recognition.
In contrast, technology specific laws exclusively promote 
digital signatures, the small subset of electronic signatures that 
utilizes cryptography to authenticate and verify messages. For 
example, Utah not only recognises their validity, but also 
develops a legal and regulatory framework specifically for 
public-key cryptography. However, with technology specific 
legislation, policymakers run the risk of prematurely supporting 
a technology before the market has declared a winner (American 
Bar Association, Legislative and Regulatory Law and Policy Issues, 
http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/ltd/legal/policy.htm). Some 
electronic signature solutions do not require public-key 
cryptography. For instance, the PenOp system transforms a 
handwritten signature into a secure electronic signature through 
handwriting analysis and mathematical functions (Benjamin 
Wright, Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic Signatures, 
http://www.efga.org/digsig/penop03.txt). The handwriting 
analysis algorithm in PenOp is proprietary and secret, which 
may lead to questions of its security if it was fully implemented. 
Unlike technology neutral laws, technology specific legislation 
will discourage use of these promising technologies.
Nevertheless, technology specific legislation is less vague and
can actively promote electronic commerce by establishing 
needed infrastructure. It comforts industry and the public by 
removing uncertainty and defining potential liabilities. 
Furthermore, digital signatures are rapidly gaining acceptance, 
and no other signature system appears poised to challenge it. A 
few private 'certification authorities,' integral parts of a digital 
signature system, have already begun operation, suggesting an 
immediate need for a legislative and legal framework.
GENERAL LEGALITY FOR ELECTRONIC 
SIGNATURES
At present, digital signatures are the most developed and 
promising of the available signature technologies. Therefore, 
governments should not fear the implementation of technology 
specific legislation that develops digital signature-related 
infrastructures, including certification authorities (discussed7 o v
below). However, legislation should not explicitly lock out other 
potential technologies. Policymakers should solidify general legal 
recognition for other forms of electronic signature, so the 
market can continue to assess their promise. This compromise 
will hopefully achieve the necessary balance to maintain 
flexibility (technology neutral) while facilitating the promising 
technology of digital signatures (technology specific).
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES
A digital signature cryptographically binds a private/public- 
key pair to an electronic document. With a signature, the 
recipient or relying party' (Bob) can verify that the message was 
not altered and that a specific key pair was used to create it. 
However, by himself, Bob cannot authenticate; he cannot take 
the next step and link the key pair to the sender or subscriber 
(Alice). The verification process 'does not yet say anything about 
who actually signed the message' (Charles Merrill, Roadmap, p. 
14) let alone who is legally bound by the message. For example, 
the whole package could have originated from a hacker (Oscar). 
Additionally, since Alice is not yet legally bound to the key pair, 
she may have no legal accountability,
Certification Authorities (CAs) solve this problem by checking 
a person's identity, registering the public key, and issuing a 
validation certificate. A CA binds the key to Alice who is then 
accountable for her subsequent signatures. Thus, after receiving 
a signed message, Bob can use a CAs service to authenticate it. 
Obviously, CAs perform a very critical role in the digital 
signature regime; if Alice's key is ever compromised, she needs 
the CA to revoke her key, invalidating all signatures after that 
date. Otherwise, Oscar can masquerade as Alice, enter into 
agreements, and perform unauthorized transactions. Similarly, 
Bob relies on the CA to keep an up-to-date listing of valid and 
revoked public keys. If a valid key is not listed, Bob may 
wrongfully refuse to sell goods to Alice, losing business and 
annoying his customer. If a compromised key remains valid, 
Oscar can defraud Bob and many other people.
With so many parties relying on CAs for accurate 
information, governments might want to regulate and license 
them in the public's interest. The Utah Digital Signature Act 
provides an illustrative example of a voluntary licensing 
framework, which defines certain minimal qualifications for 
CAs. These requirements include:
  verifying a number of minimum conditions regarding the key 
and keyholder (Alice) before issuing an authentication 
certificate; 21
  operating a 'trustworthy' computer system that is 'reasonably 
secure from intrusion and misuse; [and] provide [s] a 
reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct 
operation' (Riddle, above, at p. 15);
  posting a financial guaranty consistent with the 'financial 
responsibility it provides to persons who rely on certificates,' 
(Utah Digital Signature Act, cited in Biddle, above at p. 14) 
covering any liability claims against the CA;
  having employees with appropriate training, and maintaining 
specified record-keeping and auditing procedures.
This licensing framework adds legitimacy to CAs and 
facilitates widespread use of digital signatures. First, maintaining 
minimal operation standards inspire greater public confidence 
and willingness to use digital signatures, Without licensing, the 
public has no measure of a CA's trustworthiness, and can only 
rely on reputation. The guarantee is equally important. It 
ensures that CAs have the financial resources to compensate 
\ictims of negligence; CAs cannot simply declare bankruptcy' 
and disappear. Second, licensing forces the CAs to develop 
reasonable levels of security, including 'secure means for 
controlling usage of its private key' (Utah Code s. 46 3 201(1), 
cited in Biddle, above at p. 15). The CA uses its own private key 
to certify the keys of others. Thus, its compromise can lead to 
rampant fraud and mischief. Furthermore:
'... because the rewards from successfully obtaining a CA's private 
key could be great, criminals will likely expend considerable resources 
trying to obtain the private keys of CAs. ' (Biddle, above at p. 59).
Although liability legislation (see below) will also encourage 
CAs to be extremely cautious with their keys, the minimum 
licensing standards are a step in the right direction.
VOLUNTARY CA LICENSING?
Unfortunately, the licensing of CAs has one inherent 
drawback: further regulation and interference with business. 
Conceivably, governmental involvement is unnecessary. The 
competitive market may demand that reputable CAs hold a 
guarantee, utilize high levels of security, and abide by certain 
identity verification principles and operating practices. Worse 
yet, regulation may hamper better service practices due to a 
'regression to the mean'. Licensing standards represent minimal 
or, at best, mediocre requirements. CAs have little incentive to 
go beyond these quality control standards since the public tends 
to treat all licensed parties equally. Consequently security- levels 
will stagnate. In contrast, a non-licensed, competitive 
environment mav encourage CAs to constantly strive for high
J O JO
standards in the attempt to gain credibility and customers.
Even though it creates more regulation and government costs,
CA licensing serves worthy public interest goals by bolsteringo J r o J o
initial consumer confidence, ensuring basic security, and 
facilitating a digital signature infrastructure. A well-accepted CA 
licensing framework will promote electronic commerce, thereby 
improving productivity and the economy. Besides, the boom 
may create additional tax revenue that will offset operating costs, 
and any residual costs can he recovered through fees for 
licensing, inspection, and maintenance.
However, licensing should remain strictly voluntary. While 
CAs will naturally gravitate toward government licensing 
requirements (to bolster confidence), other industry standards 
may emerge. In the spirit of a free enterprise system, the 
government should allow the public to decide which standard or 
licensing scheme to follow. A note of caution to policymakers:
the licensing framework may create liability problems for the 
government. By approving a CA, the government implicitly 
guarantees a level of soundness and quality, If the licensed CA 
goes bankrupt as a result of a liability suit (see below), the courts 
may hold the CA regulatory agency partially liable for 
unrecoverable damages. Legislation should address this 
problem, and establish a government bail-out/insurance fund 
for CAs, similar to the bank depositors' insurance, if necessary.
CAs AND CONSUMERS
CAs will give digital signatures legal enforceability Bob will 
have confidence in the legal non-repudiation of Alice's 
signature, and will accept it for electronic transactions. Under 
normal circumstances, both parties will agree to the transaction 
and everyone is happy. But what happens if Alice's (or worse yet, 
a CAs) private key is compromised, and hackers commit fraud 
before the CA can revoke the key? Money is lost and damage is 
done. Who will the law hold liable? This section looks at liability 
with respect to CAs and consumers in a digital signature regime.
CA LIABILITY
A CA potentially acquires heavy liability risks because it 
guarantees the authenticity of the signatures. For example, a CA 
faces the following problems.
(i) If a CA fails to verify7 identity properly, the law might not 
legally bind Alice to signatures made with her key. Even 
worse, some criminal might fraudulently link his key to 
Alice's name. Depending on the situation, parties will sue 
the CA for the resulting damages.
o o
(ii) A CA may fail to promptly revoke Alice's compromised key, 
allowing a hacker to again make fraudulent transactions. 
Since Alice has already reported the compromise, most of 
the liability now falls on the CA.
(iii) Disaster scenario: hackers compromise the CA's own private 
key, and commit widespread fraud, In addition, new 
certificates must be reissued to all subscribers, and the 
public may lose confidence in the digital signature system.
These prospects of nearly unlimited legal liability present a 
serious 'barrier to entry' for new CAs. The ambiguity of the law 
furthers the problem: what exactly is a reasonable measure for 
verifying identity? Even one mistake regarding a subscriber's key 
can result in lawsuits from multiple parties.
In the absence of definitive legislation, newly formed CAs 
protect themselves through disclaimers and limited liability 
agreements. For example, Verisign, an US-based CA, defines 
three classes of authentication with increasing levels of 









Principal method of 
verifying identity*
e-mail address
as above plus: driver's 
licence, postal 
residence check
as above plus: 
notarized
*Verisign requires other information, including name, 
address, phone numbers, public key, etc.
By creating the above classes, Verisign allows users to choose 
a desired security- (authentication) level and liability limit. A
general disclaimer protects the CA further in the Verisign 
Certification Practice Statement (see 'internet' box below):
'Except as expressly provided in thejbregoing (CPS s. 1 1.1), issuing 
authorities and Verisign disclaim all warranties and obligations of any 
type, including any warranty oj merchantability, any warranty ofjitness 
Jor a particular purpose, and any warranty of the accuracy of 
information provided, and further disclaim any and all 
liability for negligence and lack of reasonable care. ' [emphasis 
added]
The courts have not yet upheld the legality of this disclaimer, 
but it immediately illustrates a major problem. As long as the 
law fails to peg a CAs liability, CAs will attempt to reduce it to a 
minimum (A Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted 
Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, Oregon Law Review 49, 
1996, at p. 27). Under the above conditions, the CA accepts no 
liability for the accuracy of its certificates, leaving the certificates 
without solid backing (Froomkin, at p. 27). Consequently, the 
only comfort to relying parties is the CAs operational 
reputation, and an unsuspecting public is left liable for the 
negligent acts of the CA (since it has no liability). Policy must
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encourage or force CAs to take greater responsibility,
The Utah licensing framework attempts to inspire responsible 
behaviour by offering 'safe harbour' to licensed and regulation- 
abiding CAs. Under the Utah Act, if a CA complies with well- 
delineated and stringent requirements regarding accuracy, 
identity verification, etc., then it has limited liability for forged 
or false signatures (Riddle, above, p. 21, 45). Even if a CA fails 
to properly validate a person's identity, the liability is limited to 
the amount specified on the certificate, but only if the CA is licensed 
(Biddle, above, p. 21, 45). Thus, CAs wishing to eliminate or 
limit their liability, will seek licensing and acquiesce to all the 
rigorous verification requirements.
However, in the long run, Utah's 'safe harbors' method is 
detrimental to digital signatures, if the government caps the 
liability of CAs and holds them unaccountable beyond certain 
requirements, CAs will lack incentive to research and develop 
improved security technologies. Only a persistent threat of 
lawsuits will goad them into promptly making improvements. 
For example, if the courts severely penalize CAs for negligent 
identification methods, they will surely find new ways to 
guarantee that their validation methods are near perfect. The 
argument applies similarly to the protection of CA private keys. 
In addition, the Utah scheme contradicts the goals of consumer 
protection. If the law ascribes no liability to the CA, then the 
two transactional parties (Alice and Bob) must absorb and 
compensate for the damage and fraud caused by criminals. 
Consumers or small businesses will bear the brunt of the 
liability. This arrangement is unfair, because in many instances 
the CA is just as culpable (or innocent) as the other parties.
CONSUMER LIABILITY
Just as a CA can lose control of its private key Alice can also 
unknowingly compromise her private key. Oscar then creates 
havoc by impersonating Alice, signing phoney contracts,
on the i
isign.dot.com/repository/CPS/intro.html
Further details can be found within the Verisign Certification Practice 
Statement of 22 August 1996.
defrauding Bob, and conducting unauthorized transactions (e.g. 
draining Alice's bank account). However, since Alice did not 
actually enter into these agreements, is she really liable?
The Utah Digital Signature Act answers 'yes.' Contradicting 
traditional signature law, which places the burden of proving a 
valid signature on the claimant (Bob), Utah introduces a new 
presumption clause:
'Utah Act s.46 3 401 provides that a document signed with a digital 
signature is normally presumed to be signed by the person owning the 
relevant private key (so long as their public key is certified by a licensed 
CA).' (Benjamin Wright, Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of 
Electronic Signatures, http://www.efga.org/digsig/penopO3.txt, at p. 4)
Essentially, beyond checking the CAs repository, Bob no 
longer worries about the validity or authenticity of a digital 
signature. The law automatically presumes that Alice created it. 
If a dispute ever goes to litigation, the onus is on Alice to prove 
that she did not sign the document. The advantage of this 
particular scheme is that Alice has a strong incentive to protect 
and track her private key. She will keep it secure and 
immediately report compromises, because the law is likely to 
hold her liable for all unauthorized agreements and charges. The 
statute arguably encourages consumer responsibility and reduces 
fraud.
However, this 'incentive' also strongly discourages Alice from 
using digital signatures at all. The general public is already 
uncomfortable with computers because of errors, glitches, and 
system crashes. Now, if consumers lose or compromise their 
private keys, they have unlimited liability. Worse still, the 
compromise in most cases will be difficult to detect and not due 
to their own fault or negligence. Focusing on the keys, criminalsO O O J '
will trick people into revealing them, develop viruses to steal 
them, and crack the underlying software or cryptography. Since 
digital signatures today are not yet fundamental to business, 
consumers still have a choice. Under Utah's nearly unlimited 
liability regime, most people will simply refuse to participate, 
hindering the growth of electronic commerce.
The Utah law also destroys Bob's incentive to verify Alice's 
signature. Traditionally, when the onus was on Bob, he would 
use phone calls, the postal service, and other methods to further 
authenticate Alice's statement or contract. These additional 
checks protected both Bob and Alice from the risk of an 
impostor. Unfortunately, since Bob only needs to check the 
repository to assure a legal signature, the Utah law removes this 
incentive to doubly verify (Wright, above at p. 4).
THE ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT
1995
An alternative liability regime is found in the familiar realm of 
credit cards (thanks to Biddle for drawing parallels between 
digital signatures and credit cards). The US Electronic Funds 
Transfer Act of f995 (EFTA) limits consumer liability for 
unauthorised activities to $50. It is the essence of consumer 
protection attributing almost all liability to the credit card 
company, This scheme has worked well because credit card 
companies can absorb the costs of fraud and 
then redistribute them among all users. 
Thus an unlucky victim is not bankrupted by 
a stolen credit card. Unfortunately, however, 
EFTA's main drawback is moral hazard. 
Since their liability is limited to only $50, 
credit card users lack incentive to protect
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and secure their cards, resulting in rampant credit card fraud 
(Charles Merrill, McCarter & English, meeting with Edward 
Cheng, 9 May 1997).
In many ways, digital signatures are analogous to credit cards. 
Alice and Bob are similar to the customer and vendor. Alice's 
private key is like a credit card number, representing Alice's 
agreement to a contract or purchase. Furthermore, a CA is 
similar to a credit card company, which is centrally positioned to 
redistribute the costs and consequences of fraud among all its 
customers. However, before developing a liability' framework for 
digital signatures based on credit cards, governments should 
consider a few discrepancies.
Unlike credit card companies, CAs are not monetary- 
middlemen. They do not receive a percentage commission for 
each sale, and do not profit from high credit card interest rates. 
In addition, signatures are often used for non-commercial 
messages, such as letters, agreements, etc.
A credit card company's liability for each transaction is 
limited to the stated price of the merchandise or service. The 
liability incurred by a CA from a digitally signed contract is 
difficult to assess, unpredictable, and may involve incidental and 
indirect damages.
A credit card transaction is inherently insecure because 
customers must transfer their numbers to a store clerk or 
operator, In contrast, digital signatures can be kept completely 
private and should never be revealed.
REPLACE THE UTAH LIABILITY LAWS?
The Utah legislation places too heavy a burden on the 
consumer/subscriber while effectively removing liability from 
the CAs. Consumers do not have to use digital signatures; if 
ascribed too much liability, they will not. The Utah legislation 
also destroys incentives for the CAs to increase security and 
contradicts accepted consumer protection ideals. Thus, while 
Utah represents an admirable attempt to attribute liability for 
digital signatures, new model legislation should consider a 
framework based on the Electronic Funds Transfer Act instead. 
This liability framework is roughly delineated below.
  Legislation should cap subscriber or consumer liability for fraudulent 
signatures at a high, but not unreasonable value (e.g., $500).
Lacking consumer protection, unlimited liability' frameworks 
only heighten public fears about computers and drive 
consumers away from electronic commerce. Eegislation 
should therefore cap consumer liability. However, in the case 
of digital signatures, the cap should be placed at a higher level 
(e.g. $500, or somehow related to the liability guaranty of the 
signature). The higher cap will encourage consumers to 
protect their private keys and diminish fraud that plagues the 
credit card industry. This expectation is justified because, 
unlike credit card numbers, digital signatures never need to 
be revealed to others. However, the consumer cap should 
remain low enough so that CAs, who have secondary liability 
(see below), will still have an incentive to actively monitor and 
prevent fraud.
  All digital signature certificates must have a maximum liability value. 
If a CA exercises reasonable care in issuing its certificates, it is only 
liable up to this maximum value (minus the amount liable from the 
consumer detailed above).
Like Verisign, governments should require licensed CAs to 
limit a certificate's maximum liability. If a CA abides by the
security and identity verification requirements consistent with 
the liability level, then the CA's liability is capped for the case 
of fraudulent or false signatures. However, the cap exists only 
if the CA responsibly fulfils its duty. If a court finds the CA to 
be negligent the cap is not applicable.
The security requirements for each liability level should be 
determined loosely by a regulatory body and more specifically 
by the courts. The legislature should not micromanage such 
details that must constantly change with technology. This 
recommendation is notably different from the Utah statute. 
Utah ascribes no liability if a licensed CA fulfils its 
requirements and caps penalties due to negligence. This 
proposed policy give CAs limited liability if it fulfils 
requirements, but no 'safe harbor' for negligent CAs.
  For each digital signature verified at its repository, a CA should charge 
a commission consistent with the liability level.
Although legislation will not explicitly state this 
recommendation, the above liability framework implies its 
development. Since the law will hold a CA liable for 
fraudulent acts committed with its certificates, CAs must 
ultimately charge their customers a premium for the 
insurance service they provide. Each time a signature is 
verified at a repository, the CA should charge the relying party 
an appropriate fee related to the liability coverage offered by 
the certificate. Naturally, the relying party can pass the fee on 
to the subscriber/consumer by incorporating it into a 
product's price.
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT
Interestingly, Biddle suggests (at p. 34) that the EFTA, as a federal law, 
may override and pre-empt the Utah legislation with respect to credit 
cards and money transfers. However, this paper will use the EFTA as a 
model for a digital signature liability regime and will not concern itself 
with the possible jurisidictional implications of the Utah Act.
Certificates used for every day communications may have no 
liability coverage. In that case, the CA may offer its verification 
services for free. However, certificates guaranteed to $10,000 
may have a verification fee of a few dollars (fractions of a 
percent). Essentially, the CA becomes an insurance company 
against digital signature fraud. It plays the law of averages and 
matches fees with the probability of fraud. These premiums will 
allow a licensed CA to compensate for the damage caused by 
hackers who compromise the keys of subscribers or who 
otherwise trick the CA.
CONCLUSION
Digital signatures are a promising technology that can 
facilitate the growth of electronic commerce on the GIL 
However, before they can have commercial significance, national 
governments must establish a unified, suitable legal framework. 
Only then will digital signatures have the legal enforceability and 
non-repudiation necessary to make them effective and widely 
used. Several initiatives have been taken by international 
organizations, US states, and the ABA to develop model laws or 
guidelines for digital signatures, In examining these initiatives, 
particularly the Utah Digital Signature Act, which has become a 
well-respected model law for other states, this paper makes four 
principal recommendations.
(i) Governments, through some international body, should
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expediently co-ordinate legislative efforts to ensure uniformity.
(ii) Although legislation should specifically address digital 
signatures, it should also recognize general forms of electronic 
signature.
(iii) Governments should establish voluntary Certification 
Authority licensing.
(iv) Policymakers should attempt to establish a digital signature 
framework similar to the US Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 
1995.
Hong Kong
With time and the prudent implementation of a legal 
framework, the use of digital signatures will expand, increasing 
efficiency, ensuring integrity, and reducing paperwork. Ultimately, 
they will attain their position as the backbone of electronic 
commerce, the future of the world economy. ©
Edward K Cheng
MSc Candidate, Fulbriyht Scholar
Department of Information Systems, London School of Economics
After the change of sovereignty
by Peter Willoughby
O n 1 July 1997 the People's Republic of China (PRC) resumed 
sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
From this date, Hong Kong
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became known as the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR) of the 
People's Republic of China.
THE BASIC LAW
The Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People's 
Republic of China (the 'Basic
Law') was adopted by the National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China on 4 April 1990. It took effect on 1 
July 1997. The Government of the HKSAR is required to 
administer the HKSAR in accordance with the provisions of the 
Basic Law. In this way, the Basic Law has become Hong Kong's 
constitution.
The Basic Law provides that only the National People's 
Congress of the People's Republic of China has power to amend 
the Basic Law. Further, only the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China has 
power to interpret it.
Six items of PRC legislation (in addition to the Basic Law) also 
apply in Hong Kong. This legislation covers the PRC's national 
capital, calendar, national anthem, national emblem, national 
flag, national day, nationality law, territorial sea and diplomatic 
privileges and immunities.
SOCIALISM/CAPITALISM
The Basic Law embodies the principle of 'one country, two 
systems'. This principle has been closely linked to Deng 
Xiaoping, the late paramount leader of the PRC. This expression 
means that the socialist system and policies of the PRC will not 
be practised in Hong Kong. Instead the capitalist system is to 
continue. Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong is to 'exercise a high 
degree of autonomy' and, subject to certain limitations, be self- 
governing for a period of 50 years following the hand-over. The 
Basic Law also specifically provides that Hong Kong's capitalist 
system and way of life will remain unchanged for SO years (i.e. 
until 30 June, 2047).
JOINT DECLARATION
On 19 December 1984, the PRC and British Governments 
signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, in 
which the two Governments agreed that the PRC Government 
would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. At 
the same time, the PRC Government agreed to the principle of 
'one country two systems', in relation to its administration of the 
HKSAR for the first 50 years of its existence.
CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
Hong Kong law continues to be made and administered by the 
HKSAR. However, under the Basic Law, the Central People's 
Government (the CPG) will be responsible for the HKSAR's 
foreign affairs and defence. The CPG's approval is therefore 
required for access to Hong Kong by foreign warships and 
foreign state aircraft; some foreign warships have visited the 
HKSAR since the hand-over. PRC military forces are be 
stationed in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, responsibility for the day- 
to-day maintenance of law and order in the HKSAR will continue 
to lie with the Hong Kong police force.
PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE BASIC 
LAW
The Basic Law includes the following protections applicable 
following the hand-over.
o
  Hong Kong will continue to enact its own laws relating to taxes 
and tax rates and the PRC will have no right to tax Hong Kong 
citizens.
  The policy of no foreign exchange controls in Hong Kong will 
continue and the Hong Kong dollar will continue to be freely 
convertible.
  The ownership of enterprises and investment from outside 
Hong Kong will be protected by law.
  Hong Kong will continue to have an Independent Commission 
against Corruption accountable directly to the Chief Executive 
of the HKSAR.
  The free movement of goods and capital into and out of Hong 
Kong will continue.
  Hong Kong will continue to pursue a free trade policy.
  Hong Kong's revenues will be used exclusively for the purposes 
of the HKSAR and will not be handed over to the CPG.
